Isolating Militarism

In Hitler’s rhetoric throughout Mein Kampf, particularly in his rebuttal against the argument blaming WWI as a cause for Germany’s dire state in the inter-war period, he provides a rather narrow-minded scope for Germany’s defeat. Whether Hitler refers to blaming the flawed German leadership for the military’s loss in WWI to Jewish propaganda, or “limits of all human adequacy,” or prewar causes that were present before the onset of war, his entire analysis is rooted in militarism (Hitler 229). That is to say, he overlooks the implications of the WWI defeat to defend the militaristic valor, and dedication of the German army. For him, the army deserved to lose, but in its steadfastness, can’t be linked to the post-war fallout. Yes, the war was a byproduct of “preconditions, which for many years had begun to undermine the foundations of the people and the Reich” (231). As Professor Ertman mentioned, prior to the war, there was a fearful executive, with a puppet emperor that didn’t want to give into any change coupled with increased pressure for democratization and liberalization. And so in this regard, the political framework entering the war was inevitably going to be altered by the direct results of military activity.

But it’s not so much that Hitler errs by defending Ludendorff’s leadership, or the leadership of the army, but that in absolving the German military from blame, Hitler’s argument is ineffective. He fails to see that military engagement in and of itself is tied to financial ramifications (war debt) and political consequences, to only name two effects. The efforts of the military to maximize war output and increase war production led to a split amongst the social democrats, a divide that formed the USPD. Even more, the direct military actions taken Germany caused the British to continue their blockade on German imports. In a sense, German military involvement was perpetuating a state of malnutrition for its own country.

In retrospect, both of these implications are only two of many, and even then, aren’t solely attributable to the military. But we see that the very idea of isolating the actions of the army is a very naïve analysis on how partaking in war sets in place the post-war conditions in Germany. So for Hitler to uphold the army’s ‘collapse’, rather than tie German defeat to the “present-day misfortune,” is a seemingly isolated take on militarism and its role during the war, and after (229).