Last week, Professor Ertman talked about how useful Weber’s concept of “charismatic leadership” was in explaining the nature of Hitler’s rise to power, in particular the notion that the charismatic leader must perform “miracles” time and time again to prove the validity of his “superhuman powers.” In this week’s readings, the examples Kershaw gives in Hitler Myth during the period leading up to Hitler’s attack on Poland make it clear how effective the theory of charismatic authority is when examining the public’s support of Hitler during this time.
Hitler’s “superpower,” as it applies to the period leading up to World War II, in Kershaw’s mind, was the ability to expand Germany’s Lebensraum – repairing the damage the Treaty of Versailles did to Germany’s global status as a world power – without the use of war as a means of achieving this. Kershaw refers to a “war psychosis” that was largely present in the public consciousness, which made the avoidance of war an essential condition that could make or break the public’s support of Hitler, as their fear of reexperiencing World War I was great enough that their approval of Hitler’s foreign policy actions hinged on a nonviolent attainment of his foreign policy goals (Hitler ultimately succeeded in altering this war psychosis, “fanatasizing” the masses into a pro-war mentality”). Hitler proved able to meet these expectations. Beginning with the plebiscite in the Saar in 1935, then with the military reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936, and the march into Austria and Anschluss in 1938, Hitler displayed his remarkable diplomatic prowess, albeit through lying and manipulation, by achieving all of these without any bloodshed at all.
Yet it is the Sudeten crisis of 1938 that is perhaps a greater testament to the validity of applying the theory of charismatic leadership to Hitler’s reign, as this was the first undertaking of Hitler’s that posed the threat of war for Germany. Although the Munich Agreement would later relieve this anxiety of war psychosis, the presence of doubt in the public’s mind of Hitler being able to liberate Sudeten without bloodshed confirms Kershaw’s notion of the inherent fragility in the faith held by the followers of a charismatic leader. Despite Hitler having proven himself with success after success, approval of his leadership could have just as easily disintegrated had he not avoided war in the Sudeten crisis.
Another interesting point that Kershaw makes is that although during this time there was in fact a significant section of the population that “remained cool and skeptical” (141) of Hitler as a “mythical figure,” his repeated success with the western democratic nations undermined the opposition’s ability to gain any momentum against him. This adds another interesting dimension to the theory of charismatic authority because it demonstrates that a leader’s repeated successes can not only strengthen his followers’ acceptance of him, they also serve to undermine the possibility of any alternate leader rising in his place.
Kershaw's diction is telling of his impressions of the German population at that time. By pointing out that despite having a significant number of people in Germany who "remained cool and skeptical" of Hitler (referring to him and his entire regime during the Third Reich synecdochically), Hitler was still able to rise to power, Kershaw could perhaps be suggesting that the other part of the German population that supported Hitler and his regime were not "cool and skeptical." Kershaw could be saying that, in other words, the other part of the German population that may have largely supported Hitler were discomposed and frenzied – a crowd that was perhaps, not in the most rational state of mind to objectively select the right leader for Germany.
ReplyDeleteI'd like to add to Mason's mention of Hitler's "repeated success." Kershaw makes this claim by quoting from another source (Footnote 66), and in this source the word "handed" is used to describe Hitler's attainment of "one success after another." The use of "handed" perhaps suggests the considerable ease at which Hitler obtained his successes, as if Hitler's rise to power was made much more feasible than it should have been. This uses of "handed" along with success that came "one...after another" portrays a smooth continuity with which Hitler obtained and remained in power. Certainly, and as we all know, Hitler's road to and hold on power over the whole of Germany were not exactly devoid of setbacks, complications and/or worries. However I think Kershaw may be underlining the ease at which Hitler came to and remained in power when considering all other social, economic and political problems at, and before, that time.